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}
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No. 16643

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action commenced by Plaintiff against its former
president and general manager for injunctive relief prohibiting
Defendan~

from competing with Plaintiff as to products developed

during Defendant's employment, prohibiting Defendant from utilizing Plaintiff's customer lists, and seeking compensatory and
punitive damages.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A temporary restraining order was issued by the Honorable
J. Duffy Palmer on September 28, 1978

enjoin~ng

Defendant from

soliciting Plaintiff's customers or from making use of Plaintiff's methods of manufacturing.

Subsequently, a preliminary

injunction was issued by the lower court restraining Defendant
from soliciting Plaintiff's customers, using Plaintiff's methods
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of manufacture, competing with Plaintiff in the sale of four
specified medical test kits, and assisting any competitors of
Plaintiff in the production of such kits.
After a full trial on the merits the court issued a permanent injunction restraining Defendant from soliciting Plaintiff's customers, from competing with the plaintiff in any of
its present product lines or services for a period of two years,
and requiring an accounting for any profits derived from Plaintiff's customers.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent requests that the permanent injunction granted
by the trial court be sustained.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not seriously dispute the majority of the
statements made in "Appellant's Statement of Facts."
lant's brief, pp. 2-9).

(Appel-

Respondent believes, however that Ap-

pellant has made certain implications in this Statement which

is not supported by the record or which is speculation on his
part.

Respondent MRC shall address these factual inaccuracies

during the Argument portion of this Brief.
It is Respondent's position that the findings of the lower
court both adequately outline the factual context of this case
and are also supported by competent evidence.

It is a fundamen-

tal rule of this Court that findings supported by clear and convincing evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.

McMahon v.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Tanner, 249 P.2d 502 (Utah 1953).
A review of the facts in light of the evidence as believed
by the Trial Court, reasonably supports the Trial Court's factual findings.

Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d 246 (Utah 1976).

The findings of the trial court (R. Vol. II, pp. 12-15) and
evidence supporting such findings are as follows:
"l.

Plaintiff is a corporation incorporated under the

laws of the State of Delaware with its principal offices and
place of business located in Bountiful, Davis County, Utah."
(R., pp. l, 23).

"2.

Defendant Nadeem M. Muna is a resident of Davis County,

State of Utah."

(Transcript of July 10 and July 11, 1979 hear-

ing, hereinafter Tr., p. 129).
"3.

That Defendant Nadeem M. Muna was employed by the

plaintiff Microbiological Research Corporation as its president
and chief executive officer from September, 1968, until February,
1978."

(Tr., pp. 17, 136).

"That as president of Plaintiff's corporation Defendant
Nadeem M. Muna was in a position to learn and did learn Plaintiff's confidential, proprietary and secret methods of operation
such as clientele lists, combinations of chemicals, methods of
production, all of which were used by Plaintiff during Defendant's employment with Plaintiff.
"It was necessary and unavoidable that Defendant Muna should
learn in confidence all of the foregoing confidential, proprieSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3-OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

tary and secret information of Plaintiff."

lTr., pp. 39, 61,

137, 164; Mawod Depo., pp. 46-50).

"4.

That the foregoing confidential, proprietary and se-

cret property of the plaintiff was and continues to be of substantial and significant value to the plaintiff in the successful conduct of its business."

(Tr., pp. 22, 23, 38, 61, 91,

120, 229; Exhibits 8, 19, 33).
"5.

That in the manufacture of Ilerpes I and II test kits,

Antinuclear Binding Antibody test kits, toxoplasmosis test kits,
and the infectious mononucleosis test kits, the plaintiff has
trade secrets that are of importance and confer upon Plaintiff
an advantage in the marketplace."

lTr., pp. 7, 77, 79, 135,

163; Exhibits, 13, 361.
11

6.

That !>aid trade secrets were developed by Defendant

for the plaintiff's benefit while Defendant was an employee of
Plaintiff and while Defendant was charged by the plaintiff with
the responsibility of developing these human diagnostic test kits
to which said trade secrets now apply."

(Tr., pp. 12, 29, 75,

79, 92, 93, 187, 190).

"7.

That Plaintiff's process for the test kits referred

to in paragraph .S above, taken as a whole, is not known to the
industry and is guarded by Plaintiff's security precautions.
(Tr., pp. 22, 23, 25, 26, 75, 79, 82, 111, 225, 2291.
"8.

That Plaintiff uses certain formulations of chemicals

and nutrients in the propagation of its cell lines as well as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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certain techniques and chemical formulations in the manufacturing
process that are known only to the plaintiff and are of value
and confer a competitive advantage to Plaintiff."

(Tr., pp. 45,

76, 77, 80, 85, 86, 88, 91, 111, 117, 120, 123, 149, 155, 157,
160, 167, 243; Exhibits 1, 11, 15).
"9.

That the formulation referred to in paragraph 8 above

was developed for Plaintiff by Defendant while Defendant was in
Plaintiff's employ."

(Tr., pp. 29, 92, 117, 132, 135, 136,

159, 161, 164).
"10.

That in February of 1978, Defendant lost his bid for

reelection as president of Plaintiff corporation and thereinafter
on or about the 28th day of February, 1978, entered into a second employment agreement with Plaintiff."

(.Tr., pp. 18, 63, 1791

Exhibit 23).
"11.

That on or about the 4th day of September, 1968 the

defendant Nadeem M. Muna for good and sufficient consideration
entered into an employment contract with the plaintiff's predecessor Microbiological Sciences, Inc. and that at all times during Defendant's employment with Plaintiff up to and including
July 28, 1978, said contract was in full force and effect and
valid and binding upon Defendant."

(Tr., p. 16; Exhibits 22,

32, pp. 6-8).
"12.

That on February 28, 1978 the plaintiff through its

officers and directors had no knowledge of the existence of the
employment contract under the date of September 4, 1968, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated
-5- OCR, may contain errors.

that Defendant knew of this contract and further knew that Plaintiff did not know of this contract and with this knowledge Defendant wholly failed and refused to reveal the existence of
this contract and further deliberately concealed its existence
while negotiating a separate employment contract on February 28,
1978."
"13.

(Tr., pp. 14, 19: R., pp. 162-163; Exhibit 32, pp. 6-8).
That the September 4, 1968 employment contract between

Plaintiff and Defendant contained conditions limiting Defendant's
right to compete with Plaintiff.
"14.

(Exhibits 22: 32, p. 8).

That unless restrained by this Court, it is likely

that the defendant Nadeem M. Muna will solicit Plaintiff's customers that became known to him while in Plaintiff's employ and
said Defendant will appropriate to his own use or for the use of
others the secret and proprietary information of Plaintiff and
that by using such information, Plaintiff will suffer irreparable
damage, the amount of which is not capable of exact proof and
which no adequate remedy at law exists."

(Tr., pp. 37, 38, 183,

186, 192, 194: Exhibits, 26, 27).

"15.

That Defendant has solicited Plaintiff's customers and

has been in competition with the plaintiff."

(Tr., pp. 183, 194;

Exhibits 26: 27: 32, p. 9).
This action was conunenced in September, 1978 shortly after
Defendant resigned from the company.

(R., pp. 1-7).

A temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court
on September 28, 1978.

(R., pp. 20-211.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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An evidentiary hearing was held on October 26, 1978 at

which time the trial court granted Plaintiff a preliminary injunction against Defendant.

Defendant was resti::ained from soli-

citing customers of Plaintiff, using Plaintiff's methods of
manufacturing, competing with Plaintiff in the sale of four
specified medical kits, and in rendering services or advice to
any competitor.

(R., pp. 36-37; Ex. 32).

A full trial was held on July 10, 1979 and July 11, 1979
before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer.

The court took the case

under advisement and rendered a memorandum decision approximately
one month after the hearing.

(R., pp. 190-191).

The court

granted Plaintiff a permanent injunction against Defendant from
soliciting Plaintiff's customers for the sale of products presently manufactured by Plaintiff whose identity Defendant learned
of during his employment and also enjoined Defendant from competing with Plaintiff in any of Plaintiff's present product lines
or services for a period of two years.

The court required defen-

dant to render an accounting of any profits made from Plaintiff's
customers and ordered return of any customer lists.

(R., pp. 190-

191).
It is from the memorandum decision and the preliminary injunction that this appeal is taken.

(R., p.

194).

ARGUMENT

THE PERMANENT INJUNCTION ISSUED BY THE TRIAL
COURT WAS PROPER.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-7Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The trial court after carefully reviewing the evidence presented to it at the hearing and prior to the hearing determined
. that Defendant should be restrained from soliciting customers
of the plaintiff whose identity and location Defendant learned
of during the course of his employment with Plaintiff, should
be enjoined from competing with Plaintiff in any of its product
lines for a period of two years, and should make an accounting
as to any sales previously made to Plaintiff's customers.
p. 190}.

(R.,

The court denied Plaintiff's claim for compensatory

damages, punitive damages, and attorney's fees.

(R., p. 191).

This Court is constrained to look at the whole of the evidence in light favorable to the trial court's findings, including
any fair inferences to be drawn from the evidence and all circumstances shown, and the trial court's findings should not be
disturbed unless the evidence is such that all reasonable minds
would be persuaded to the contrary.

Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568

P.2d 751 (Utah 1977}; Howarth v. Ostergaard, 515 P.2d 442 (Utah
1973}.
Respondents submit that the findings of the trial court
were supported by competent evidence and were firmly based upon
two separate legal theories:

first, that there existed an ex-

press contract between the parties prohibiting the conduct enjoined by the trial court; and, second, that there is an implied
obligation for an employee not to reveal trade secrets or other
confidential information.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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A.
The Defendant Was Contractually Restrained From Divulging Information Obtained During His Employment with Plaintiff
and from Competing with Plaintiff for F.ive Years After Termination of Employment.
Two separate agreements were introduced by the parties at
trial.

The first was an agreement entitled, "Management Con-

tract" dated September 4, 1968 (Ex. 22}.

The second was an

agreement entitled "Employment Agreement" dated February 25,
1978.

(Ex. 23).

Appellant argues that the 1978 agreement was the only controlling document since it was a novation of the first agreement
or, in the alternative, its terms were inconsistent with the
first agreement therefore negating by law the terms of the 1968
contract.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-22).

Both of these con-

tentions are erroneous.
1.
The 1968 Contract is Controlling in that the 1978
Contract was Obtained by Defendant's Failure to Disclose Material
Facts to the Plaintiff Corporation.
Appellant maintains that because paragraph l of the 1978
agreement states that "all previous employment agreements and
understandings are mutually terminated and settled" that this
language eliminat.es the viability of the previous agreement.
pellant's brief, p. 10).

(Ap-

This contention, however, cannot stand

careful scrutiny.
Respondent maintained throughout the trial that this second
agreement was void since the defendant had failed to disclose
the existence of the prior employment agreement which was a maSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-9Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

terial fact in the formulation of the second contract.

The

undisputed evidence shows that the corporation had no knowledge
of the existence of the 1968 agreement prior to the execution
of the latter agreement.

(Tr., pp. 14-19).

Plaintiff's presi-

dent stated that the purpose of paragraph 1 was to show that
Defendant was no longer to be considered the president, general
manager and chairman of the board of directors and that it was
not the intent of the parties to specifically revoke prior unknown agreeaents.

ca.

t

pp• 162-1631 •

Appellant maintains that he had no affirmative obligation
to notify the company of this prior agreement since he was no
longer an officer of the corporation and because of numerous
alleged indications eliminating a fiduciary duty to the corporation.

(Respondent's brief, pp. 23-28).

Respondent maintains,

however, that a fiduciary duty did in fact exist and that the
failure of Defendant to inform the corporation of the prior agree·
ment justified the trial court's conclusion that the 1978 agreement was void.

(R., p. 191).

It is elementary that a person who is elected as an officer
or director of a corporation accepts a fiduciary responsibility
to serve the interests of those who elect him which he must discharge with fidelity and which he should not desert for his own
personal gain.

Cox v. Slagle, 431 P.2d 575, 577 (Utah 1967);

Branch v. Western Factors, 502 P.2d 570 (Utah 1972).

Thus, if

Defendant had still retained his status as an officer of the cor·

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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!e·

r·

poration at the time the second contract was presented to him
it would have

be~n

his affirmative duty to notify the company

of the prior agreement when it was obvious that the new management was unaware of its existence.
The fact that Defendant was no longer an officer in the
corporation does not alter this result.

It was to Defendant's

benefit to induce the plaintiff's corporation into entering in
a second contract for the purpose of revoking the prior 1968
agreement which contained numerous restrictions upon Defendant's
conduct.

Thus, while the 1978 contract was made after Defendant

was no longer an officer in the corporation one of its purposes
(as now argued by Defendant in his brief} was to allegedly void
a prior agreement entered into during Defendant's tenure as both
officer and director.

For this reason the general rule cited by

Respondent that severance of official relationships terminates
fiduciary duties of former officers to a corporation has
application in this case.

(Appellant's brief,

no

p. 27).

This Court in Glen Allen Mining Company v. Park Galena Mininq
Company, 296 P. 231 (Utah 1931) addressed this problem.

In that

case officers of a corporation engaged in conduct prior to their
resignation which had an adverse effect upon the existence on
the corporate entity.

This Court stated:

The defendants seek to avoid liability on
the ground that they had in fact ceased to
act as officers of the company when the contract for the purchase of the mortgage rights
and the agreement with the creditors to force
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-11Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.

a sale of the company's property by execution
were entered into. But that alone is not
enough to relieve them. They learned of the
prospective values of the property and added
to the financial embarrassment of the plaintiff while they were officers. During that
time they developed and put in motion the
plans that resulted in each of those contracts •
• • • Under such conditions, an officer cannot
avoid responsibility for violating his duties
as a fiduciary merely by delaying the final
execution of a contract until the expiration
·of his relations. The rule governing such a
situation is well stated in Trice v. Comstock
(C.C.A.) 121 F. 620, 625, 61 L.R.A. 176, as
follows:
Nor is it any defense to the suit to
enforce this trust that the agency
had terminated before the confidence
was violated. The duty of an attorney to be true to his client, or of
an agent to be faithful to his principal, does not cease when the employment ends, and it cannot be renounced at will by the termination of
the relation.
It is as sacred and
invioble after as before the expiration of its terms.
Id. at 239.
(Emphasis added}.
This same principle was supported by a New York court when it
said, "Were the rule otherwise, the fiduciary obligation would
disintegrate by resignation of the fiduciary whenever the attraction of personal gain at the expense of the cestui que trust
proved stronger than what would then be an unenforceable moral
obligation."

Albert A. Volk Company v. Fleschner Bros., 60 N.Y.

S.2d 244 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1945).
The trial court heard evidence that the new management was
unable to locate any prior employment agreement with the defenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
by the Utah State Library.
-12Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

dant.

The Board of Directors decided that an agreement should

be reached with the defendant.

(Tr., p. 181.

The plaintiff

corporation was completely dependent upon the representations of
Defendant and his honesty to inform the president and other members of the management as to whether or not there was any prior
existing management or employment agreement.

The defendant did

not at any time inform the officers of the corporation of the
prior agreement.

(Tr., p. 14; R., pp. 162-163).

Regardless of any animosity, bad feelings, or "battles"
Defendant had with Plaintiff corporation he was still under an
obligation to inform the corporation of any prior agreement before executing an agreement which allegedly terminated all such
agreements since the effect of any latter agreement would alter
the agreement entered into during his fiduciary relationship as
an officer and director.
Appellant maintains, however, that Plaintiff corporation
should have known of this agreement since it eventually produced
the agreement during the first preliminary injunction hearing.
Appellant states, "This Court should not permit one party to a
contract to avoid searching its files and exercising reasonable
diligence in ascertaining facts pertinent to the contract under
negotiation."

(Appellant's brief, p. 30).

In fact, however, the undisputed testimony is that a search
was made of the corporate files by the new president and that no
agreement was found.

It was only by contacting a prior attorney

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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who had a copy of the agreement in his files that the 1968 agreement was ever found.

('rr., p. 16).

Thus, the 1968 agreement

was missing from the corporate file at the time the second agreement was entered into--such files having been previously maintained by the defendant.

(Tr., p. 136).

The corporation was

diligent in performing its duties and the failure of the corporation to obtain the docwnents from an outside source cannot
be used against it as argued by Defendant.
As stated by one court with reference to this type of argument:
When once it is established that there has
been any fraudulent representation by which
a person has been induced to enter into a
contract, it is no answer to his claim to
be relieved from it to tell him that he
might have known the truth by proper inquiry. He has a right to retort upon his
objector:
"You, at least, who have stated
what is untrue for the purpose of driving
me into a contract cannot accuse me of want
of caution because I relied implicitly
upon your fairness and honesty.
Barren G.
Collier v. Connelley, 116 S.W.2d 849 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1938).
Appellant also argues that as a matter of law Plaintiff cor·
poration should have been charged with notice of the existing
agreement.

Respondent does not dispute the general statement of

law that notice to a corporate officer or employer is notice to
the corporation.

These rules, however, were derived for the

benefit of third parties dealing with a corporation and not for
the benefit of corporate employees themselves who may choose not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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to notify a corporation of an event for the agent's own benefit.

The Enterprise Foundry and Machinery Works case cited by

Appellant illustrates this example since the plaintiff in that
case was a third party corporation seeking enforcement of a
contract with the defendant corporation.

(Appellant's brief, p.

31).

The law is clear that even an innocent misrepresentation
on which one rightly relies may invalidate a contract where it
relates to a material matter.
Contracts.

17 C.J.S., Section 147, p. 902,

Likewise, in the case of persons occupying a fiduciary

or confidential relation, contracts prejudicial to the interest
of the subordinate party are ordinarily condemned as presumptively or constructively fraudulent, so that a_ctual fraud ·ordinarily
need not be shown.

The requisite relation exists in any case

where there is confidence deposed on one side and a resultant
domination and influence on the other.

C.J.S.,

~'

at p. 910.

Plaintiff corporation had no reason to believe that Defendant would not inform it of all material facts relating to the
formulation of a new contract including the prior employment agreement.

Even after the proxy battle and the obvious hard feelings

generated by it (as noted in Appellant's brief, p. 24) all indications were that Defendant was going to cooperate and help the
company in any way he could.

(Tr., p. 29}.

Plaintiff's presi-

dent stated that right after the proxy battle Defendant and the
president went to a restaurant and Defendant told the president
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that he would let bygones be bygones and that he would help the
company in any way he could.

(Tr. , p. 6 6) .

substantiated by Defendant himself.

This testimony was

(Tr . , p . 178 ) •

In sununary, the trial court was correct in finding that
Defendant had a fiduciary duty during the negotiations of the
1978 agreement to inform the plaintiff of the existence of the
1968 agreement and that this concealment made a nullity of the
second contracts.

(R., Vol II, p. 15).

This finding is sup-

ported because of the continuing fiduciary duty Defendant owed to
the company regarding any previous transactions while Defendant
was an officer and director, the inability of Plaintiff corporation to learn of the existence of such contract by ordinary
means, and by the statements of Defendant to the Plaintiff corporation that he would cooperate and help the corporation whenever possible.
For these reasons the result of voiding the 1978 agreement was to make the 1968 agreement controlling including paragraph 6 which prohibited Defendant from competing with Plaintiff
for five years after leaving the company or disclosing any information which was the property of the company.

(Exhibit 22) .

This express contract, therefore, was enforced by the trial court
by granting injunctive relief to the plaintiff.
2.
Even Assuming Arguendo that the 1978 Contract Remained Valid There was Still no Novation of the 1968 Contract
and its Consistent Terms Regarding Competition are Enforceable.
Appellant argues that paragraph 1 of the 1978 agreement
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stating that all previous employment agreements and understand,ings are mutually terminated and settled nullifies the 1968
agreement.

(Appellant's brief, p. 10).

This paragraph, however,

makes no specific reference to the 1968 agreement.

Neither does

it speak in terms of a "management contract" which was the title
given to the previous contract.

The trial court was, therefore,

justified in determining the intent of the parties concerning
any ambiguity existing in that paragraph.

Lynch v. Spilman, 431

P.2d 636 (Cal. 1967).
Plaintiff's president testified that at the time he executed
the 1978 agreement he was not aware of any prior written agreement in existence.

(Tr., pp. 14, 17).

He further stated that

the purpose of paragraph 1 was to show that Defendant was no longer
to be considered the president, general manager and chairman of
the board of directors and that it was not the intent of the parties to specifically revoke prior unknown agreements.

(R., pp.

162-163).
Respondent has argued that a novation occurred substituting
the latter agreement for the former agreement.

It is fundamental,

however, that whether or not a novation has been accomplished depends upon the intention of the parties.

As stated by one legal

authority:
Whether or not a novation has been accomplished depends upon the intention of the
parties. This intent is the controlling
element in determining the question, and,
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unless the transaction was intended to extinguish the old obligation by substituting
the new one therefor, a novation is not
effected. Intention may be determined from
the facts and circumstances of the transaction and the conduct of the parties. 66
C.J.S., Section 18, p. 703. Novation.
The requisites of a novation are a previous valid obligation,
an agreement of all the parties to the new contract, consideration,
extinguistnnent of the old obligation and the validity of the new
one.

The preexisting obligation must be extinguished or there

is not a novation.

"A mere modification will not suffice; any-

thing remaining of the original obligation prevents a novation."
Lampley v. Celebrity Homes Inc., 594 P.2d 605 (Colo. App. 1979).
Furthermore, the burden of proof as to a novation rests
upon the party claiming it.

D.A. Taylor Company v. Taulson, 552

P.2d 1274 (Utah 1976).
Because the evidence is undisputed that Plaintiff was !!!!aware of the prior obligation it can hardly be said that the parties intended the 1968 contract to be substituted for the 1978
agreement.

The most Appellant can claim is that Plaintiff waived

and relinquished all unknown contractual obligations existing
between the parties.

This supposition is both illogical and is

contradicted by the uncontroverted statement of Plaintiff's presi·
dent.
Defendant next asserts that even if a novation did not occur
a substitution of inconsistent terms would be required and the
latter agreement would ccntrol.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 13-21).
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Once again, Respondent does not dispute the general legal principle asserted by Appellant.

However, as applied to this situa-

tion it is clear that there is no inconsistency in the noncompetition clauses.
The 1968 agreement states the following:
Muna agrees that during the terms of this
agreement he will not engage in any other
commercial activity in any way competitive
with the business of the company, or its
affiliated companies, and that, for a period
of five years after leaving the employ of
the company, he will not engage in any way,
directly or indirectly, in any business competitive with the company or its affiliated
companies (.in) any state in which any of
them do business. Muna further agrees that
he will not disclose to any other person any
information which is the property of the
company or its affiliated companies.
{Ex.
22) (Emphasis added) •
The latter 1978 agreement states the following:
During the term of this Agreement Muna shall
not act as a consultant for, or accept employment from any competitor of Micro.
(Ex. 23}.
Both agreements state that Muna will not compete with the
company during the term of each agreement.

In addition, however,

the 1968 agreement requires Muna not to compete after leaving the
company and restricts him from disclosing information which is
the property of the company.

Thus, there is no inconsistency

between the two agreements in that the latter agreement does not
specifically negate nor even address the question of termination
of employment or disclosure of information.
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v.

The case of Rosenberg

D. Kaltman and Co., 101 A.2d 94

(N.J. Super. 19531 is extremely similar to the instant case.
In that case a contract was entered into between the plaintiff
and defendant corporation in 1950 when Plaintiff was a sales
supervisor for the company.

One of the paragraphs expressly

provided that the plaintiff could not compete against the defendant in certain states for a period of one year after termination of the contract.
Thereafter in 1953 the plaintiff ceased to be a sales supervisor for Defendant but was employed as a salesman.
contract was entered into which also

re~tricted

A second

Plaintiff's abil-

ity to compete but reduced the geographical area so restricted.
The plaintiff in Rosenberg contended that the restrictive
covenant contained in the 1953 agreement superseded the 1950
agreement.

A situation identical to the instant case.

The court first noted that it is primarily a question of
the intention of the parties to be ascertained from the contracts
themselves whether the earlier contract is discharged and superseded by a new contract.

The terms of the second contract must

be so inconsistent with those of the former contract that they
cannot stand together.

Id. at 96.

The court therein stated:

The two covenants could have a concurrent
existence, the first and greater to expire
by its own terms one year after the date of
Plaintiff's termination of employment as
sales manager, and the second, one year after
the termination of his employment as salesman.
If there were any reasonable basis for
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the defendant to require this protection in
the original contract for one year after the
termination of employment thereunder by reason of complete disaffiliation of the plaintiff with the defendant, there is no sound
reason for imputing an intent to waive such
protection from the fact that although the
employment in one capacity was terminated,
the plaintiff continued'to be affiliated with
the defendant in a limited capacity and in a
limited territory. Id. at 97.
This same reasoning is applicable here.

If there was any

valid reason for restricting Defendant after leaving the company
or from disclosing information obtained from the company, that
reason did not terminate merely because Defendant changed his
job status.
A fair reading of the two agreements reveals that the noncompeting clauses are not inconsistent.

Both agreements prohi-

bit Defendant from competing during his employment but the 1968
agreement, in addition, requires that he not compete for five
years after leaving his employment and that he not divulge information which is the property of the company.

Therefore, re-

gardless of what other inconsistencies may be present as to
other clauses contained in the two contracts there is no inconsistency in the non-competitive clauses and the 1968 agreement
must be given full force and effect.
B.
Even Assuming Arguendo that there was no Express Contractual Provision Relating to Competition and Disclosure of Secrets, there Remains an Obligation Implied by Law Not to Injure
Defendant's Former Employer.
Even if it is assumed arguendo, that the provisions in the
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1968 contract are not binding upon the defendant the trial co"'t

!

was still justif_ied in restraining Muna from competing or divulging
confidential information based upon an implied obligation of
employment.

As stated by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals:

The law is well settled that one of the
implied terms of a contract of employment
is that the employee will hold sacred any
trade secrets or other confidential information which he acquires in the course of
his employment, and that therefore an employee who has left his employment is under
an implied obligation not to use trade secrets or other confidential information
which he has acquired in the course of his
employment, for his own benefit or that of
a rival, and to the detriment of his former employer. Tlapek v. Chevron Oil Company, 407 F.2d 1129, 1133 (8th Cir. 1969).
Likewise, the Restatement of Agency also establishes an
implied obligation.

It states:

Unless otherwise agreed, after the termination of the agency, the agent:

*
(bl

*

*

ijas a duty to the principal not to
use or to disclose to third persons,
on his own account or on account of
others, in competition with the principal or to his injury, trade secrets,
written lists or names, or other similar confidential matters given to
him only for the principal use or
acquired by the agent in violation
of duty • • • • Restatement (2d) of
Agenc2:, Section 396 (1958).

The violation of a trade secret is based upon the violation
of a confidential relationship and breach of trust rather than on
the theory that the plaintiff might have a property right in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
-22-

trade secret.
19601.

Stimson v. Lawrence-David, Inc. 356 P.2d 84 (Or.

As stated by the United States Supreme Court:
Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable
secret or not the defendant knows the facts,
whatever they are, through a special confidence that he accepted. The property may
be denied, but the confidence cannot be.
E.I. Du Pont De Nemours Powder Company v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100 (1917).

Thus, an employee may be restrained from revealing information even though technically it does not arise to the definition
of a "trade secret" if such information was obtained through
confidence and through the employee's status in the company.
In the instant case, however, the evidence supports the
trial court's findings that "Plaintiff's formulation of chemical and nutrients used in the propagation of sales and used in
the manufacture of its diagnostic test kits are proprietary information and trade secrets owned by the plaintiff."
1.
The Evidence Supports the Finding of Trade Secrets and Confidential Information.
Appellant has defined "trade secret" in terms of the Restatement of Torts, section 757 (Appellant's Brief, p. 32).
Respondent agrees with this definition and supplements comment
"b" with the following sentence omitted in the quotation of Appellant.

"It may be a formula for a chemical compound, a pro-

cess of manufacturing . . • preserving materials, a pattern for a
machine or other device or a list of customers."
Appellant asserts that under the Restatement of Torts defiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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nition the proces.ses and ;ro.aterial comprising Plaintiff's test
kits do not constitute trade secrets and therefore, are not
deserving of protection.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 31-351.

This

argument is without merit.
First, a trade secret is not only the ingredients that go
into making the product but also consists of the correct amounts
of each ingredient and the particular procedures for mixing them.
Morton v. Rogers, 514 P.2d 752 (Ariz. Ct. App. 19731.

The fact

that one or more of the ingredients or procedures used in the
test kits are not unusual does not negate the fact that the entire process can itself be a trade secret utilizing these materials.
Second, and most important, Defendant has attempted to
make an argument based upon testimony and evidence favorable to
his position while ignoring contrary evidence presented by
Plaintiff.

As stated by this court in Brady v. Fausett, 546 P.2d

246 (Utah 1976):
In appealing this case, Brady seems to enjoin this Court with a principle to the effect that the evidence should be reviewed
by taking as true everything he would do,
to the exclusion of any evidence admitted at
the behest of his opponents, irrespective of
its weight, credibility, or admissibility-to which thesis we cannot prescribe. Id. at
248.
Appellant devotes some 11 pages in his brief to the analysis
of each process or ingredient which Appellant claims may have
been considered by the trial court to constitute a secret.

(~p-
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pellant's brief, pp. 31-42).

While it is no doubt true, for

example, that there is evidence in the record showing that specific items such as isopropyl alcohol is commonly used as a
fixative, the segregation of each of these items by themselves
distorts the findings of the trial court.
As noted by the trial court, the plaintiff's process "taken as a whole" is not known to the industry and is guarded
by Plaintiff's security precautions.

lR., Vol. II, p. 13).

Likewise, the record must be examined as a whole to determine
whether there is support for the trial court's conclusions-even though they may be contrary to the arguments and evidence
raised by Defendant.
Plaintiff's president, Edward Mawod, testified that in
1969 when the company was started, there were no commercial companies marketing the ANA test kit.

(Tr., p. lll.

He testified

that the defendant repeatedly told him not to utilize outside
consultants since they would not be qualified to assist in that
the work was unique.

lTr., p. 12).

He related that it took

over one year to commercially develop a test for toxoplasmosis.
(Tr.,p.21).
He explained the security precautions taken by the company.
All files are locked in a fireproof vault with the president
and Dr. Golden, the director of the laboratory, having the only
keys.

(Tr., p. 22}.

No person is employed with the company

until he or she signs an employment agreement of confidentiality.
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Any visitor must also sign a log and a non-disclosure statement,
(Tr., p. 23°[.

All letters leavin9' the office had to be screened

personally by Mr. Mawod.

(Tr. , p. 3 0).

Al though some of these

procedures were instituted after Mawod became president, others
were in existence prior to that time as evidenced by the 1968
employment agreement with Defendant.

(Tr., p. 65).

Plaintiff called Albert Laibovitz, a professional consultant of microbiology, who had been involved in tissue cultures for 23 years.

(Tr., pp. 69-70).

This witness testified

that the use of cookie jars and Saran Wrap was highly unusual in
his experience.

(Tr., p. 75)..

He stated that by Plaintiff rnak-

ing a slide which had a shelf life of over one year (using mere
refrigeration rather than freezingl a unique product had been
produced.

(Tr., p. 761.

This witness made the following per-

tinent remark after having been examined as to individual ingredients:
But, I think when you look at a technique,
you have to look at a technique as a composite method, and so the method of rinsing,
fixing, and storage and the cells and then
the slide are stored in phosphate buffered
saline in the refrigerator up to a period of
one year, and the method of storage, I think
all is very unusual and I hadn't seen anything like that before.
(Tr., p. 781. (Emphasis added) •
Likewise, after noting that many of the ingredients used
in the 'test kits were commonly utilized in the scientific community Mr. Laibovitz then said:
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Now all of these ingredients have been used
in a large number of different medil.lltl, but
not in this combination. And so this combination is a unique combination being used
in MRC.
(Tr., p. 79}. (Emphasis added].
The witness stated that with the large number of different
possible combinations available in development of a kit that
the chances were 99 out of 100 that the same process would never be duplicated by him even with all of his experience.
p. 82).

lTr.,

He stated that given six months he could perhaps develop

a test kit but that it would never be any better than that developed by MRC.

(Tr., p. 87}.

The witness stated that the ad-

dition of tryptos phosphate broth and a buffer solution gives
MRC's product an advantage over products of other companies.
(Tr., p. 85).

He also stated, that while other cell lines could
(Tr.,

be used, those employed by MRC made the product superior.
p. 86).

Dr. Carol Golden, Plaintiff's laboratory director wita a
degree in microimmunology, also gave her expert opinion as to
the methods employed by the plaintiff company.

She stated, for

example, that using 27 slides in a baking dish was a unique idea
and that she was not aware that Saran Wrap could autoclave.
(Tr., p. 111).

She also was unaware that tape could be used

to hold the slides from floating to the top and she thought the
tape would be toxic and would cause damage to the cells.
p. 112).

(.Tr.,

When Dr. Golden first arrived at MRC, she did not un-

derstand why yeast extract, lactalbumen hydrolsate and tryptos-
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phosphate broth were added to the normal media formula.

After

experimenting, she discovered that, the product quality diminished
when these ingredients were removed.

She now uses them for the

manufacturing process even though she did not know exactly what
effects the additives produced.

(Tr., p. 1171.

She stated that

she would never have chosen that combination of ingredients.
(Tr., p. 118).
She noted that even with her experience, she would have a
great deal of difficulty in devising methods to produce in mass
quantities tests for ANA, toxoplasrnosis, and herpes.
120).

(Tr., p.

She related that she had obtained kits from the major

competitors, Virgo and Meloy and found that the location of the
cells on the slides were different and that human cells were not
used in th.eir kits thus making them inferior.

(Tr., p. 120).

Even the testimony of Defendant himself supports the confidentiality and trade secret claim of the plaintiff.

Defendant

admitted that the company promoted the kits through costly advertising.

He also admitted that the company paid for several

visits throughout the country promoting the kits and even for
trips to Canada, Europe, and Costa Rica for promotion of the kits.
(Tr., pp. 137-139).
Defendant acknowledged the interview with the Utah Daily
Record where he stated that MRC had a unique product.

(Tr., P·

146; Exhibit 361.
He also acknowledged that he had made statements in the
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past that a unique feature of the kits was the human cells bein9
used rather tfian rat cells which allowed for more uniform testing. · (Tr., p. 155; Exhibit 1) .
Appellant attempts to discredit Exhibits 1, 5, and 15
which were letters written by Defendant to various people praising the use of human cells in the various kits.

Appellant as-

serts that he was only praising a certain line of cells which
existed between 1970 through 1974.

(Appellant's brief, p. 51.

However, Exhibit 9 is a letter written by Defendant in 1976, two
years after the extinguishment of the special human cells, in
which he stated, "It is my scientific opinion and conclusion
that the hmnan amnion cell gives the most reproducible results."
It

was

stipulated that Plaintiff is the only conunercial pro-

ducer, known to the parties, of ANA test kits which use the human amn.ion ce·lls.
Defendant was asked to read Exhibit 5 which is an article
for a trade journal written by him in 1974.

When asked why he

referred to the ANA test kit as being superior he replied, "Because I made it."

(Tr., p. 1611.

While claiming that he had developed several techniques
prior to his employment with MRC he admitted that at the time of
the incorporation he received 20,000 share of conunon stock "in
consideration of the services performed and to be performed and
processes developed and to be developed" by him.
Exhibit 28).

(Tr., P • 132;

Thus, Appellant was handsomely compensated for any
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kno~led~e

or

tecb.nique~ ~h..i_ch he

claimed to have deyeloped

prior to lils entry with. the company and such. techniques should
inure to the benefit of Plaintiff regardless of the general
rule that prior techniques are not the property of a company.
(J\.ppe.llant's brief, p. 36).
Dr. Muna also stated that it took over a year and a half
to develop the toxoplasmosis kit and that Dr. Wentz was hired
specifically to assist in this production at an annual salary
of at least $18,000.

(Tr., pp. 164-166).

Appellant attempts to

argue that his 1966 article in the American Journal of Clinical
Pathology states precisely the same technique which he developed
for the plaintiff in the manufacturing of ANA kits.
brief, ·p. 2).

(Appellant's

However, he admitted that the cells used in that

article were not human amnion cells, that ether alcohol was used
rather than isopropyl alcohol, that sodium bicarbonate was not
used as a fixing agent and that petri dishes were used for the
article rather than pyrex.

(Tr., pp. 199, 222).

Finally, the

defendant admitted that there may well be over 1,000 different
components for the making of nutrient media for cell cultures.
(Tr., p. 225).
After the testimony of Defendant, Plaintiff's president, Ed
Mawod, was recalled and stated that he had attempted to find the
foonulas of the medias and techniques used by competitors but
that he was told by them that they were trade secrets.

(Tr., P·

229}.
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The preceding recital of facts introduced into trial
shows that unquestionably there was sufficient evidence to
sustain the findings of the trial court that Plaintiff utilized processes and formulas which constituted trade secrets
and confidential information.

Even though Appellant may have

introduced evidence to the contrary, the trial court was at liberty to decide the credibility and weight of the evidence.
This court has stated that an appellate court will not reverse
a trial court when the evidence is such as to sustain the findings made and the judgment rendered is based upon the facts
found and is in accordance with the law of the case.

Branch.

v. Western Factors, Inc., 502 P.2d 570 (Utah. 19721.
This same principle applies to the court's order concerning customer lists.

Mr Mawod testified that the customer list

is compiled by keeping a list of people doing business with. the
company.

Each time a new customer orders a product, their name

is put on the list.

(.Mawed deposition, pp. 47-481.

Thus, this

list is not a general mail order type of listing but is actual
customers who use Plaintiff's product.
to injunction protection by a court.
517 F.2d 492 (7th Cir.

1975)~

Such lists are entitled
In Re Uniservices, Inc.,

28 ALR 3d 7.

Thus, all of the findings by the trial court are supported
by competent, credible evidence even though, as noted in Appel-

lant's brief, there is evidence and inferences to the contrary.
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2.
Even U All of Plaintif,f' s Ingredients or Processes· were Known to the Public, a Trade Secret Could Still
Exist.
Appellant vigorously argues throughout the last portion of
his brief that niany of the ingredients and processes are generally known in the scientific connnunity and found in the literature.

This same argument was advanced in Elcor Chemical Corpora-

tion v. Agri-Sul, 494 S.W.2d 204 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973}.

The court

there noted that Appellants had argued that the process involved
in that case was not really a secret but .was something that could
have been obtained by reading articles and trade magazines.

The

court then noted some 15 cases in which similar arguments were
advanced.

The court stated:
In each of these cases the court rejected
·the argument now advanced by appellee by
pointing out that whereas information could
have been obtained from other sources the
point is that such was not done. This
knowledge was a product of their work, the
combination of apparatus and equipment,
materials and procedures which made up the
trade secret that should have been protec~
ted. by virtue of the confidential relationship between the parties.
Id. at 212-213.

The court then made an important distinction which is of ten
overlooked in cases involving trade secrets.

The court said:

It must be born in mind and reiterated that
the Agri-Sul process is not a patent but a
trade secret. The essence of ELCOR's action
is not infringement but the breach of obligation of good faith imposed by contract.
It
does not Inatter that Miller and Kruse could
have gained their knowledge from a study of
books and magazines. The fact is that they
did not do s·o.
Instead, they gained this
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knowled~e from ELCOR
~ential relationship

by way of their confiand in S"O doing they
incurred a duty not to use it to ELCOR's· detriment. This duty was oreached by them
and because of this breach, we are comoelled
by equity to extend to ELCOR adequate injunctive relief. rd. at 213.
(Emphasis added).
This same principle was reiterated in Nucor Corporation v.
Tennessee Forging Steel Service, 476 F.2d 386 (8th Cir. 19731
where the court held that even though an engineer could have prepared plans for a plant without the use of the existing plans
for another company's plant, this did not minimize the breach
of trust by the plant owner's former employee who used the plans
for a competitor.
Likewise, in Stimson Lumber Company v. Laurence David, Inc.
356 P.2d 84 COr. 1960) the court noted thac even if a formula
used by the plaintiff was commonly known and could be used by
others, this still would not justify its use by the defendant
if he confidentially acquired the information.

The court there

quoted the Restatement of Torts which states:
Although given information is not a trade secret, one who receives the information in a
confidential relation or discovers it by improper means may be under some duty not to
disclose or use that information. Because
of the confidential relation or the impropriety of the.means of discovery, he may be compelled to go to other sources for the information. Id. at 87.
In summary, even if it were assumed for purposes of argument
that all of the ingredients and processes used by Plaintiff were
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known in po,t;tions:

o~

the sc ienti,f ic

CO.IJJ!tluni ty

and eyen i.f it

were assumed that tlle exact processe!:f and procedures were also
used in the scientific cOI11111unity, Defendant would still be
restrained from using the method$ obtained through his employment if he acquired such information during a confidential
relationship.

The law does not allow a defendant to begin

searching for other sources of information in the general scientific community to justify knowledge which he has in fact obtained solely from his employment.
For these reasons, the trial court could properly enjoin
Defendant from competing with Plaintiff in the same product
line and from utilizing Plaintiff's customer list even if it
is found that no express contractual prohibition exists.
In closing, it should also be observed that while Appellant
claims that the injunction is overly broad and ambiguous this
question was never presented

b~fore

the trial court in order

that any clarification could be made.

The practice of urging

on appeal what can be_ perhaps cured in the lower court should
no~.~~.... ~?:~red.
·;...

1

...

••

The trial court has considerable discretion in granting injunctive relief.to an aggrieved party.

In this case the court

could easily justify a two-year injunction against competition
based upon the smallness of the plaintiff corporation, the prior
conduct of Defendant in soliciting Plaintiff's customers, and
the availability of work for Defendant which would not compete
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with Plaintitt.

The injunction was correctly entered.
CONCLUS'ION

The express 1968 contract forbade Defendant from competing
with Plaintiff after termination of employment.

This agreement

is controlling since the latter agreement was void, or, in the
alternative, the non-competition clause was never modified by
the latter agreement.
In addition, there exists an implied obligation not to utilize or divulge trade secrets acquired through employment.

The

evidence justified both a finding of trade secrets and a breach
by Defendant.
The imposition of a two-year injunction was not unreasonable
in that Defendant could still perform other work and would be
allowed to compete against Plaintiff at the termination of the
injunction.
The decision of the trial court should be affirmed.

HENS COOK

Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent
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